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Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of
Regulating Product Placement in Movies
William Benjamin Lackeyt

In the past decade, motion pictures have become veritable
moving billboards.1 The widespread practice of "product placement," by which a company either pays to have its product included in a film or provides the product free of charge in exchange
for exposure, 2 has created the impression that Hollywood is more
interested in producing feature length advertisements than in
making films.'
Although product placement may generally be dismissed as a
mere annoyance, the practice of placing harmful and addictive
products in films is disturbing, particularly when tobacco products
appear in films that are marketed for viewing by children and
teenagers. This targeting of children is made more problematic by
evidence revealing that product placement is generally a more effective marketing device than other forms of advertising."

t B.A. 1991, Bard College; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Chicago.
' See Gary Strauss and Linda Dono Reeves, A Fine Line Becomes Finer: More Ads
Meld With Entertainment,USA Today 6B (Sept 8, 1992); Mark Crispin Miller, Hollywood:
The Ad, 265 Atlantic 41 (Apr 1990).
' The founder of MMI Product Placement, an agency devoted to placing its clients'
products in films, estimates that "[three] percent [of placements] are paid, [while] the remaining 97 percent are contra arrangements, in which the product is provided ... during
filming in exchange for an appearance." Don Douloff, Place, Show & Win, Toronto Star Hi
(July 27, 1991).
3. See Bruce Horovitz, New Twist in Tie-Ins: 'Home Alone 2' May Redefine Merchandising, LA Times D1 (Nov 12, 1992) (noting the views of critics who describe the inclusion
in Home Alone 2 of toys developed by the director, 20th Century Fox, and Tiger Electronics, as "product placement at its ugliest"); Kenneth R. Clark, Group Goes After BrandName Film Props, Chicago Trib C3 (June 10, 1991) (examining the views of the Center for
the Study of Commercialism, which petitioned the Federal Trade Commission to either regulate the practice or ban it outright); Strauss & Reeves, USA Today at 6B (cited in note 1)
(providing a brief overview of the controversy over product placement); Marc Gunther,
Product Placement Angers 22 Groups, Calgary Herald Eli (Sept 5, 1992) (quoting a consumer advocate and law professor as saying that product placement "is really George
Orwell's 1984 vision of the future put into place").
' Miller, 265 Atlantic at 45 (cited in note 1).
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If product placement constitutes "commercial speech,"'5 then

it enjoys a lesser degree of protection under the First Amendment
than other speech, and Congress can constitutionally regulate it.
Although no court has expressly addressed this question, two bills
which propose to ban paid product placement of tobacco products
have already been introduced in Congress.' Classifying product
placement as commercial speech and seeking to restrict its use,
however, raises important constitutional questions about the propriety of government regulation of film content.
This Comment argues that product placement, whether paid
or unpaid, constitutes commercial speech as defined by the Supreme Court, and concludes that Congress should prohibit the
product placement of cigarettes by passing a modified version of
one of the bills that has already been introduced in Congress. Part
I of this Comment examines the practice of product placement and
describes why it should be regulated. Part II sets forth the definition of commercial speech as outlined by the Supreme Court and
argues that product placement constitutes commercial speech
under that definition. Part III discusses the two legislative proposals to prohibit the placement of tobacco products in films, and proposes modifying one of these bills so as to improve Congress's ability to prevent cigarette placement. Part IV argues that this
modified bill would pass constitutional muster and would not violate the First Amendment rights of the filmmaker or the commercial speaker. This Comment concludes by considering whether
placement of other products can and should be similarly regulated.
I.

PUSHING PRODUCTS THROUGH THE MOVIES

Product placement is a classic case of one hand washing the
other: filmmakers defray production costs while manufacturers
gain access to a massive advertising market. Manufacturers either
pay movie producers to include their products in films, or, more
commonly, provide the products to the studios free of charge. As
film production costs soared during the 1980s, producers began to
more actively seek this type of financial help from manufacturers
"Commercial speech" is a legal term of art referring to speech that proposes a commercial transaction. It is afforded lesser protection under the First Amendment than other
types of speech. See, for example, Bd of Trustees of the State University of New York v
Fox, 492 US 469, 473-76 (1989).
' See Protect Our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989, HR 1250, 101st Cong, 1st Sess
(Mar 2, 1989), in 135 Cong Rec E725-26 (Mar 9, 1989); Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act, HR 5041, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (June 14, 1990).
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in order to cut expenses.7 In return, filmmakers provided manufacturers with access to a huge market at a cost far lower than that
for conventional advertising.8
Product placement first gained widespread notoriety when the
prominent appearance of Reese's Pieces in E.T.9 caused sales of
that candy to skyrocket. 10 The success of the Reese's placement
"paved the way for a flurry of commercial involvement in feature
films."" The practice of product placement has now become so
routine that it often blends unnoticeably into films. For example,
some recent movies containing placements include Terminator 2
(Diet Pepsi),' 2 Wayne's World (Pizza Hut, Doritos, Reebok,
Nuprin, and Pepsi),"3 Total Recall (28 different products shown 55
different times),' 4 and Thelma and Louise (Diet Sprite, Coca-Cola,
and Ryder Trucks). 15 Virtually every big-budget Hollywood film
now contains some placed products."
Of all the products placed in films, cigarettes have generated
the greatest controversy. 7 Tobacco companies began to place their
products in movies long before the successful E.T. placement,
often in films designed to appeal to children and teenagers. For
example, Philip Morris provided Marlboros .for Margot Kidder, 8
who played the chain-smoking Lois Lane in the 1978 release of Superman. 9 Marlboros reappeared in Superman 1120 after Philip
Rocky the Salesman: Brands on the Screen, Economist 70, 75 (Apr 20, 1991).
8 A moderately popular film is viewed by millions in theaters and by tens of millions
through videocassettes. David Kalish, Now Showing: Products, 23 Marketing and Media
Decisions 28 (Aug 1988). A film that grosses about $50 million dollars at the box office can
be expected to sell between 200,000 and 300,000 videocassettes, resulting in an "additional
25-30 million impressions." Id. Furthermore, a sizable cable television industry adds millions of additional viewers to the potential audience. Id.
9 E.T., The Extra-Terrestrial,Universal Pictures 1982.
'0 See Kalish, 23 Marketing & Media Decisions at 28 (cited in note 8).
1 Id.
12 Tri-Star Pictures 1991. See Economist at 75 (cited in note 7).
13 Paramount Pictures 1992. See Joseph Gelmis, Metalheads at Home, Newsday 83
(Aug 14, 1992). Wayne's World, however, actually satirized product placement; the two
main characters, Wayne and Garth, announced that product placement is bad before proceeding to "pitch" the products.
" Tri-Star Pictures 1990. See Strauss & Reeves, USA Today at 6B (cited in note 1).
" MGM-Pathe Entertainment 1991. See Douloff, Toronto Star at Hi (cited in note 2).
" Miller, 265 Atlantic at 41-46 (cited in note 1).
17 See, for example, Anita M. Busch, FTC Looking Into Movies With Paid Tobacco
Placement, Back Stage 1 (Apr 6, 1990). Ben Cohen, senior counsel to the House Subcommittee for Tourism, Transportation, and Hazardous Materials, notes that tobacco companies arouse more ire than other product placers because "[t]oothpaste doesn't kill people."
Id.
" Clark, Chicago Trib at C3 (cited in note 3); Busch, Back Stage at 1 (cited in note 17).
" Superman: The Movie, Warner Brothers 1978.
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Morris paid $42,000 for numerous exposures to their cigarettes, including scenes of Superman being thrown into two cigarette delivery trucks and Superman flying past a billboard bearing the familiar Marlboro logo. 2 The Liggett Group entered the fray in 1983
when it paid Universal $30,000 to have its Eve cigarettes appear in
22 Indeed, the highest
Supergirl.
placement fee to date was paid by
a tobacco company; Philip Morris paid $350,000 to have its Lark
cigarettes2" displayed prominently as 007's cigarette of choice2 4 in
License to Kill,25 a 1988 James Bond film. Timothy Dalton, the
actor who played Bond, also used a pack of explosive Larks to
shatter a glass window in a villain's office.
Although the tobacco industry has adopted new industry
guidelines that "formally eliminate paid product placements in
movies,"' it has not abandoned the practice of supplying valuable
"props" to studios upon request.2 For example, the American Tobacco Company provided an estimated $25,000 worth of Lucky
Strikes and Pall Malls to the makers of Beverly Hills Cop,2 8 a film
in which comedian Eddie Murphy posed as a smuggler with a cigarette-filled truck.2 9 Because tobacco companies and film producers
generally fail to disclose in the final credits whether the cigarettes
used in the film were provided free of charge by the manufacturer,
it is difficult to determine whether products have been placed or
purchased by the studio. Martin Scorsese's recent production of
Goodfellas, 0 for example, featured a series of scenes similar
to-and involving the same products as-those in Beverly Hills
Cop. It is likely that American Tobacco provided the cigarettes to
20 Warner Brothers 1981.

" Thomas Ferrarro, The Hollywood-Madison Avenue Connection?, UPI (Oct 17, 1985),
in LEXIS (Nexis library, Omni'file). See also 135 Cong Rec at E726 (cited in note 6) (remarks of Thomas Luken introducing HR 1250, a bill which would have banned paid product
placement of cigarettes); Cheryl Wetzstein, Tobacco Companies Decide to Stop Smoking
Up the Silver Screen, Wash Times Cl (Dec 20, 1990).
"' Universal Pictures 1983. The Liggett Group has publicly admitted making the payment. See 135 Cong Rec at E726 (cited in note 6).
"' Lark cigarettes are manufactured and marketed jointly by Philip Morris and the Liggett Group. See 135 Cong Rec at E726 (cited in note 6).
"' See Busch, Back Stage at 2 (cited in note 17); 135 Cong Rec at E726 (cited in note 6);
Wetzstein, Wash Times at C1 (cited in note 21).
28 20th Century Fox 1988.
26 Wetzstein,
27

8
2"

Wash Times at Cl (cited in note 21).
See id; Busch, Back Stage at 2 (cited in note 17).
Paramount Pictures 1984. See Wetzstein, Wash Times at Cl (cited in note 21).
Wetzstein, Wash Times at C1 (cited in note 21).

"0Warner Brothers 1990.
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the studio free of charge although neither party has confessed to
such an arrangement."'
Critics of product placement often compare this practice to
subliminal advertising, deriding it as "one of the sneakiest and
most insidious forms of advertising around," and arguing that it
"represents the crass commercialization of movies and products." 2
Unlike subliminal advertising, however, product placement is often
effective,3 3 as illustrated by the explosion in sales of Reese's Pieces
after E.T. and Ray-Ban "Wayfarers" after Risky Business. 4
As noted above, products are often placed in films that are
designed to appeal to children and young adults. Congress has acknowledged that when cigarettes3 5 or alcohol"' are the placed products, this type of "targeting" presents particular problems that
make regulation desirable. Representative Thomas Luken, for example, upon introducing a bill that would have banned tobacco
placement, explained that one of the "most important[ ]" motivations for the bill was ending "an insidious technique by the
merchants of addiction to get young people to smoke . . . .- Tobacco companies, however, have continued to place their products
in a number of films that appeal to children (for example, the
three Superman films, License to Kill, and Beverly Hills Cop), despite the fact that tobacco use is the most preventable cause of
illness and premature death in the United States,36 and is unique
"'

Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into Commercial

Speech?, 1992 U Ill L Rev 301, 301 n 1 (citation omitted) (quoting one marketing executive
as stating that "[n]othing in ... movies is incidental . . . . If a product appears on camera
in a movie, you can be sure somebody put it there.").
02 Douloff, Toronto Star at HI (cited in note 2) (quoting Jill Savitt, a spokesperson for
the Center for the Study of Commercialism ("CFSC") in Washington, D.C.). In May 1991,
the CFSC petitioned the Federal Trade Commission to require that any product placements
included in a motion picture be shown in the opening credits. The petition specifically requested that the FTC investigate "widespread advertising" in Ghost, Home Alone, Pretty
Woman, Total Recall, and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, movies which the petition
claimed cumulatively made almost 160 references to one hundred brand name products. Id.
3
Miller, 265 Atlantic at 45 (cited in note 1).
3, See Wetzstein, Wash Times at C1 (cited in note 21) (noting that sales of Reese's
Pieces rose 70 percent after E.T.); Douloff, Toronto Star at H1 (cited in note 2). Within a
year after Ray-Ban provided two free pairs of Wayfarer glasses for Tom Cruise to wear in
Risky Business, sales of that model tripled. Douloff, Toronto Star at H1. Similarly, after
Ray-Ban provided 30 to 35 pairs of its Aviator model sunglasses for Cruise and his fellow
flight school students to wear in Top Gun, its sales increased between 30 and 40 percent. Id.
3
135 Cong Rec at E725 (cited in note 6).
8 See Cut! It's Miller Time, 13 Am Mktplace (Sept 10, 1992), in LEXIS (Nexis library,
Omni file). For an examination of the possibility of regulating the product placement of
alcohol, see note 113 and accompanying text.
31 135 Cong Rec at E726 (cited in note 6).
11 See HR 5041 at § 2(1) (cited in note 6); HR 1250 at § 2(1) (cited in note 6).
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in its ability to kill the user when used as intended. 3s Although
some tobacco companies have ended paid placement, they have not
yet abandoned the practice of unpaid placement. Moreover, although several bills have been introduced to ban or limit this practice, there currently exist no legal restrictions on the use of product placement.
II.

PRODUCT PLACEMENT CONSTITUTES REGULABLE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH

Commercial speech doctrine provides that although the First
Amendment affords some constitutional protection to commercial
speech, it is nevertheless regulable.' The application of commercial speech doctrine to the practice of product placement poses two
basic questions: first, is product placement commercial speech; and
second, if it is, how may Congress regulate it. The first question,
addressed by this Part, raises two sub-issues: first, is product
placement, on its own, commercial speech; and second, even if
product placement is commercial speech, is it immune from regulation because it is part of a larger artistic work which is fully protected by the First Amendment.
A. Product Placement Is Commercial Speech
When the Supreme Court first drew a distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech in Valentine v Chrestenson,4 the Court held that the First Amendment provided "no restraint on government [from proscribing or regulating] purely commercial advertising."4 Although the Court has since held that
commercial speech does enjoy First Amendment protection, 3 its
original distinction between non-commercial speech on the one
hand and "purely commercial advertising" on the other, informs
the Court's current understanding of commercial speech.

"' HR 5041 at § 2(2) (cited in note 6).
" See notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
41 316 US 52 (1942). The opinion was only three pages long and cited no precedent, a
fact emphasized by virtually every citation to Valentine in the past two decades. Justice
Douglas, a member of the Valentine Court, later noted that "[t]he ruling was casual, almost
offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Cammarano v United States, 358 US 498, 514
(1959) (Douglas concurring).
42 Valentine, 316 US at 54. The speech at issue was a combination of political protest
and advertising. Id.
" See note 86 and accompanying text.
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In Pittsburgh Press Co. v-Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations," the Court defined commercial speech as speech which
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," thereby
establishing an understanding of commercial speech that largely
survives today."' The Court, in applying this definition to classified
advertisements, held that the ads in fact did no more than propose
a commercial transaction-that of possible employment-and were
"thus classic examples of commercial speech.""'
The Pittsburgh Press Court reasoned that in order to determine whether speech proposes a commercial transaction, courts
must examine both the content of the speech and the motivation
of the speaker.4 7 In subsequent decisions, however, the Court has
emphasized these two factors to varying degrees. For example, in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission of New York, 4 8 the Court held that its earlier definition of
commercial speech in Pittsburgh Press is only satisfied when the
"expression relate[s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker
9
and its audience.'
In two more recent cases, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico 0 and Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v Fox, 51 the Court broadened its understanding of the types of speech that constitute a proposal of a commercial transaction, while continuing to incorporate in its definition of commercial speech Central Hudson's economic motivation
criteria. In Posadas,the Court found that a statute prohibiting references to gambling in hotel-casino advertisements aimed at local
Puerto Rican residents constituted a permissible regulation of

" 413 US 376 (1973).
" Id at 385. This definition of commercial speech was subsequently reaffirmed by the
Court in Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809 (1975), and Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 US 748 (1976).
46 413 US at 385. The question in Pittsburgh Press was whether a city ordinance which

forbade sex discrimination in hiring was constitutional as applied. Id at 378. The Pittsburgh
Human Relations Commission charged that the Pittsburgh Press had violated the ordinance
by publishing classified ads under headings designating jobs as "male" or "female." Id at
379. The classification was either specified by the advertiser or offered in response to inquiries by the newspaper. Id at 380.
'7 Pittsburgh Press, 413 US at 386-88. The Court examined both
the commercial motives behind the advertisements and the actual message of the ad.
48

447 US 557 (1980).

" Id at 561.
60 478 US 328 (1986).
6 492 US 469 (1989).
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commercial speech.2 According to the Court, the speech at issue
proposed a commercial transaction for gambling, and thus could be
restricted." In so holding, Posadas suggested that the mere mention of a product sold by a producer-advertiser constitutes a proposal for a commercial transaction and is thus commercial speech
under Pittsburgh Press. Further, by emphasizing that the statute
at issue in Posadas was limited to casino owners, the Court implicitly adopted Central Hudson's holding that the identity and motivation of the speaker is important in determining whether the
speaker is proposing a commercial transaction.
In Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v
Fox, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York statute that prevented a representative of American Future Systems
("AFS") from holding, on a state university campus, a "Tupperware party" 4 that included a presentation of household tips
and homemaking information. 5 The Fox Court expanded its understanding of commercial speech by reformulating the Pittsburgh
Press definition to include any speech which "propose[s] a commercial transaction," 5 not just speech "which [does] no more than
propose a commercial transaction. ' 57 Applying this modified test,
the Court concluded that there was "no doubt" that at least part
of the speech at the Tupperware party proposed a commercial
transaction. 8 In so holding, the Court included "mixed" commercial and non-commercial speech in its definition of speech that can
serve to propose commercial transactions.
The incorporation of Posadas and Fox into the framework of
Pittsburgh Press and Central Hudson suggests that the current
Court would view any speech or "mixed speech" that proposes a
commercial transaction as commercial speech. Under this view, any
speech by a seller of a product designed to persuade consumers to
purchase the product would constitute commercial speech. Under
the current holdings of the Court, therefore, product placement

Posadas, 478 US at 340. Among other things, the statute prohibited hotels from making specific reference to the word "casino" in advertisements that were accessible to the
Puerto Rican public. Id at 333.
53 Id.
" The party consisted of "demonstrating and offering products for sale to groups of 10
or more prospective buyers at gatherings assembled and hosted by one of those prospective
buyers (for which the host or hostess stands to receive some bonus or reward)." Fox, 492 US
at 472.
" Id at 474.
6 Id at 473-74 (emphasis added).
7 Pittsburgh Press, 413,US at 385 (emphasis added).
88 Fox, 492 US at 473.
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should be included in commercial speech because by seeking to
persuade movie viewers to purchase the placed product, the practice of product placement proposes a commercial transaction.59
1. Product placement is economically motivated by the
"placer."
If Philip Morris paid a magazine to publish a full-page advertisement consisting solely of the Marlboro logo, it would clearly
possess the requisite economic motivation to qualify the ad as
commercial speech. Similarly, product placement is speech driven
by an economic motive. The manufacturer's speech in product
placement stems solely from the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience. The manufacturer's motive is to induce the
movie viewer to buy the placed products.
Commercial speech is created only when a manufacturer
places the product in the film for an economic purpose. Thus, the
mere exposure of brand names in a film is not rooted in an economic motive sufficient to qualify the entire film as commercial
speech. For example, a filmmaker who, on his own, includes commercial references in his film, does not produce commercial speech.
The speaker in that case, the filmmaker, would have no economic
motivation for including the goods in the film. Indeed, he would
most likely be unaffected by whether the viewer purchases the
product. In contrast, the conscious placing of products in films is
expressly rooted in economic motives, and thus constitutes commercial speech.
2. The content of product placement proposes a commercial
transaction.
The advertisement described above, a full-page Marlboro logo
in a magazine, would constitute a proposal for a commercial transaction under Posadasand Fox although the content of the ad may
not specifically propose that the reader purchase the product. Indeed, such an ad would be analogous to a hotel purchasing a billboard with the word "casino" emblazoned across it, which, in
Posadas,the Court deemed commercial speech.
Similarly, product placement proposes a commercial transaction. The manufacturer of a product pays or provides "props" to a
movie producer for the sole purpose of exposing his product to a
wide audience. Like the Puerto Rican casino owner using a bill" For an opposing view, see Note, 1992 U Ill L Rev at 315-27 (cited in note 31), which
argues that product placement does not constitute commercial speech.
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board featuring the word "casino," or a merchant purchasing a
newspaper ad, a manufacturer obtains space in a movie in order to
propose a commercial transaction. Thus, under the expansive standard established in Posadas and Fox, product placement clearly
constitutes commercial speech.
B. Product Placement May Be Regulated
In determining whether product placement is regulable as
commercial speech, a court must examine the nature of the product placement itself, not the film as a whole.60 This is consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press, which recognized that commercial speech within a larger work protected by
the First Amendment can indeed be regulated. The Court held in
PittsburghPress that classified advertisements, although a part of
a newspaper, are regulable as "classic examples of commercial
speech."'" Similarly, although motion pictures are accorded the
same First Amendment protection as a newspaper or book,6 the
portions of a film that contain placed products can be distinguished from the 'whole; like newspaper editors, filmmakers can
sell or trade space in their movie to a manufacturer.
Moreover, the fact that a filmmaker retains a great deal of
control over how a product is included in the movie does not remove the placement from the realm of commercial speech. The Supreme Court has stated that a publisher's exercise of editorial
judgement over a commercial advertisement "does not necessarily
strip commercial advertising of its commercial character." 63
Finally, product placement cannot be insulated from regulation on the ground that it is somehow intertwined with the film as
a whole. In Fox, the Court held that commercial speech is not immune from regulation unless it is "inextricably intertwined" with
'64
non-commercial speech by some "law of man or of nature.
Under this standard, the Court concluded that "advertising" was
"oOne commentator has suggested that because a movie is entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as a novel, the movie as a whole must be examined in order to determine the reach of the First Amendment. Id at 321.
" Pittsburgh Press, 413 US at 385. See also Posadas, 478 US at 340 n 7; Zauderer v
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 US 626, 637-38 n 7 (1985).
62 See, for example, Joseph Burstyn v Wilson, 343 US 495, 501-02 (1952) (movies are

"included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments").
" Pittsburgh Press, 413 US at 387. See also Capital BroadcastingCo. v Mitchell, 333 F
Supp 582, 584 (D DC 1971).
"' Fox, 492 US at 474.
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not "entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommer65
cial speech" merely because it was linked to a public debate.
In Fox, the Court rejected the contention made by AFS that a
presentation at a Tupperware party was fully protected by the
First Amendment merely because it addressed a number of noncommercial subjects, such as financial responsibility and how to
run a home efficiently.6 6 The Court stated that because the noncommercial and commercial speech were not inextricably intertwined, the speech need not be classified as non-commercial in its
entirety.6 7 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reasoned that "[n]o
law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares
without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics
without selling housewares," and nothing in the statute precluded
the presentation of the noncommercial messages or required them
to be combined with commercial messages.6 8
One commentator has argued that products used in movies are
inextricably intertwined with the film because it would be virtually
impossible for a film to be realistic if all commercial references
were excluded. 9 Under the reasoning of Fox, however, cinematic
realism is not a "law of man or of nature

' 70

that makes it impossi-

ble to sell products without producing movies, or to produce movies without placing products. Under the holding in Fox, therefore,
product placement can be regulated.
III.

MODIFYING THE CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE
THE PRODUCT PLACEMENT OF CIGARETTES

Congress has already considered two bills that would restrict
placement of tobacco products in films. Representative Luken's
bill, the "Protect Our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989, ''71

would have prohibited all tobacco consumer sales promotion that
can "be seen or heard by any person under the age of 18," with the
exception of text advertisements that could appear in specified locations.7" The bill sought to cover product placement by defining
08

Id at 475, citing Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 US 60, 67-68 (1983).

Fox, 492 US at 474.
Id. The respondents relied on Riley v Natl Federation of the Blind, 487 US 781
(1988), which held that speech can be classified as non-commercial speech even if state law
requires it to include many commercial elements. Id at 796.
88 Fox, 492 US at 474.
08 See Note, 1992 U Ill L Rev at 326-27 (cited in note 31).
70 Fox, 492 US at 474.
71 HR 1250 at § 1 (cited in note 6).
78 Id at § 3(a).
"

17
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"consumer sales promotion" as any "payment to have a registered
brand name of a tobacco product appear in a movie or play."7
During hearings on the bill, tobacco companies attacked the
proposed legislation as unconstitutional, claiming that the limitations it placed on cigarette advertising were excessively restrictive. 74 The bill ultimately failed to make it out of the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials."
In the second session of the 101st Congress, Representative
Henry Waxman introduced a second bill that would have restricted the placement of tobacco products in movies.7 6 In particular, the "Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act" would have
prohibited paid product placement in films by making it:
unlawful within the United States for the manufacturer,
packager, or distributor of tobacco products . . . to pay
or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product or any
tobacco product trademark appear in any movie, music
video, television show, play, video arcade game, or other
77
form of entertainment.
A modified version of the Waxman bill, with the product
placement provision intact, made it out of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, but was not taken up by the
full Commerce Committee before the end of the 101st Congress. 78
Although its present status is uncertain, aides expect the bill to
resurface in the near future. 9
The product placement provisions of these two bills are underinclusive and thus preclude them from effectively addressing the
practice of product placement by tobacco companies. The Luken
bill suffered two notable shortcomings. First, by permitting the
placement of products whose "brand name is the name of a corporation" in existence prior to the passage of the bill,8 0 the bill ironically would have allowed paid product placement by Philip Morris
Id at § 3(b)(2)(G).
See Cheryl Wetzstein, Advertising, Tobacco Industries Call Cigarette Act Unconstitutional, Wash Times C3 (July 26, 1989); Kathy Kadane, States News Service (July 28,
1989), in LEXIS (Legis Library, Alleg File).
78 Bill Tracking Report, in LEXIS (Legis Library, BLT101 file).
76 HR 5041 (cited in note 6). The initial draft of the bill would also have severely restricted other types of tobacco advertising by permitting advertisements to include only a
warning about the dangers of smoking and the brand name of the product. Id at §§ 4-6.
71 Id at § 6(b)(4).
"8See Communications Daily 6 (Oct 4, 1990).
70 Id.
80 HR 1250 at § 3(b)(2)(G) (cited in note 6).
71
14
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for their "Philip Morris" brand cigarettes or by the Dunhill company for their "Dunhill" brand cigarettes although the harm from
those cigarettes is no different than the harm from cigarettes with
other names. Second, the Luken bill failed to specifically address
the problem of unpaid product placement,"1 the practice by which
the tobacco industry provides their products free of charge to
movie producers and studios.8 2
Like the Luken bill, the Waxman bill would have failed to
solve the problem of unpaid product placement. By limiting the
product placement ban to those cases in which a tobacco company
has "paid or cause[d] to be paid" to have its product included in a
film, the bill would have failed to address the problem of unpaid
83
product placement.
Because the Waxman bill, or a modified version of it, will
likely be reintroduced in the future, it should be amended to address the problem of the unpaid product placement of tobacco
products. One solution would be to add another subsection to the
product placement provision of the original bill-section
b(6)-which would read as follows:84

" The bill did ban all "consumet sales promotion" which could be seen or heard by a
person under the age of 18, but defined "consumer sales promotion" as "payment" to have a
tobacco product appear in a movie or play. Id at §§ 3(a), 3(b)(2). This definition would not,
on its face, sweep in unpaid product placement.
82 See notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
8 HR 5041 at § 6(b)(4) (cited in note 6). Although courts may interpret the bill as
categorizing the practice of providing free cigarettes in return for exposure as an "in-kind"
payment, such a result could easily be avoided by the proposed rewording of the bill.
Section 6(b)(1) of the bill would prevent any tobacco manufacturer or distributor from
"distribut[ing] or caus[ing] to be distributed any tobacco product as a free sample or to
make any tobacco product available at no or reduced cost through the use of coupons or
other promotional method." This clause, however, would not necessarily prevent unpaid
product placement, because the underlying intent of the phrase, "free sample," appears to
limit the ban to the provision of cigarettes free of charge to consumers. The proposed
amendment is clearer and specifically targets unpaid product placement.
84 The original version of Section 6(b) of HR 5041 reads in full as follows:
(b) PROMOTION: It shall be unlawful within the United States for the manufacturer, packager, or distributor of tobacco products(1) to distribute or cause to be distributed any tobacco product as a free sample or to make any tobacco product available at no or reduced cost through the
use of coupons or other promotional method,
(2) to sponsor or cause to be sponsored any athletic, music, artistic, or other
event in the name of a tobacco product trademark or in a manner so that a tobacco product trademark is publicly identified as a sponsor of, or in any way associated with, such an event,
(3) to market, or cause to be marketed nontobacco products (including toys)
or services which bears [sic] the name of a tobacco product trademark,

288

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

Section 6(b) -

It shall be unlawful.

. .

[1993:

for the man-

ufacturer, packager, or distributor of tobacco products.
6) to provide free of charge, or at a reduced price,
any tobacco products, products bearing the name of a tobacco product, or products bearing the tobacco product
trademark to any person for the purpose of having the
products included in a movie, music video, television
show, play, or other form of entertainment.
This subsection would effectively prevent the promotion of tobacco products by tobacco companies in the specified media. Companies would be prohibited not only from placing their products,
but also from attempting to circumvent the ban by providing to
the studio any promotional materials other than tobacco which
bears the name of a tobacco product. Because the bill is aimed
solely at tobacco companies, however, it would not prohibit a producer or director from choosing to include a tobacco product in his
film; he simply would no longer be able to receive these "props"
free of charge.85
IV.

THE MODIFIED WAXMAN BILL WOULD PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER

Although product placement may be regulated as commercial
speech, the government is limited in its ability to restrict its use.8

(4) to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product or any tobacco
product trademark appear in any movie, music video, television show, play, video
arcade game, or other form of entertainment, or
(5) to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product trademark appear
on any vehicle, boat, or other equipment used in sports.
85 As drafted, the Waxman bill provided for potentially severe penalties. The Act was
to be enforced by the Attorney General upon the recommendation of the Secretary. of
Health and Human Services. Violators of the Act were to be subject to a civil penalty of no
more than $100,000 per day for each violation. HR 5041 at § 11 (cited in note 6). The bill
also provided that "any interested organization" could seek injunctive action and be compensated for its attorney's fees and expenses if it prevailed. Id.
The penalties provided in the Waxman bill are more structured than those in the
Luken bill. The Luken bill provided that a violation of the advertising ban would be considered a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which grants the FTC
the discretion to levy fines and other penalties. The bill also provided for a private cause of
action for damages against any person who violated the ban. HR 1250 at § 4 (cited in note
6).

I. Commercial speech is no longer denied First Amendment protection. In Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, the Court held that commercial speech must be afforded some protection. 425 US at 762. Justice Blackmun stated that "[iut is a.matter of public interest that
[private economic decisions], in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
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The current test for evaluating the constitutionality of speech restrictions calls for a balancing of the importance of the expression
against the government's interest in regulation.8 7 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court adopted a four-part balancing test that
has largely survived subsequent decisions. Under the four-part
test, courts must ask whether: (1) the commercial speech concerns
a lawful activity and is not misleading;8 8 (2) the asserted governmental interest is "substantial"; 9 (3) the regulation "directly advance[s] the governmental interest asserted"; 90 and (4) the regulation is "more extensive than necessary to serve that interest."9 1
After Fox, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test has
served only as a minor restriction on the scope of the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. Indeed, the fourth prong
does not require the government to use the least restrictive regulation to reach the desired end. Rather, the First Amendment requires only a "'fit' between the [government's] ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends ' 92 which is "reasonable" 9 3
and "narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. ' 94 Therefore, if the government is able to assert a substantial interest, it
may choose any narrowly tailored regulation reasonably designed
to advance that objective.9
The relevant provisions of the Waxman bill, including the proposed addition, would pass constitutional muster under the fourpart Central Hudson test as modified by Fox, and therefore should
be upheld as an acceptable restriction on commercial speech.96
Under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the expression
sought to be regulated clearly concerns a lawful activity and is not

the free flow of commercial information is indispensable." Id at 765. The Court recognized,
however, that commercial speech regulation in some forms was "surely permissible." Id at
770.
87 Central Hudson, 447 US at 563. The Court stated that the protection afforded to
commercial speech depended upon "the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." Id.
88

Id at 566.

89 See id.
90

See Central Hudson, 447 US at 563.

91 Id.
92 Fox, 492 US at 480, citing Posadas, 478 US at 341.
8 Id at 480.
94

Id.

95 The Court stated that "[wlithin those bounds" outlined, "governmental decisionmakers [must] judge what manner of regulation may best be employed." Id.
0' Although the bill contains a number of different provisions regarding tobacco advertising and packaging, this Comment examines only the constitutionality of section 6(b)(4)
and the proposed section 6(b)(6), which would address product placement.
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misleading; 7 tobacco is legal and, for the purposes of this analysis,
this Comment assumes that product placement is not misleading.9
Second, the state's asserted interest in protecting the health of
American citizens and in reducing the volume of cigarette advertising that induces minors to smoke 99 is "substantial.' '10 0 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the government's "interest in
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest."' 0'1 Because tobacco use is the most
preventable cause of illness and premature death in the United
States, 0 21 lower federal courts, not surprisingly, have explicitly recsubstantial interest in reducing the numognized the government's
10 3
ber of new smokers.
Third, the restrictions "directly advance[ ]" the state's asserted interest.'0 In Capital Broadcasting v Mitchell,'0 5 a district
court upheld a Congressional ban on cigarette advertising on television and radio, noting that the rational basis for imposing such a
ban was that broadcast ads were effective, particularly with young
people. 0 1 Regulating product placement of cigarettes has the same
rational basis. As noted earlier, studies show that product placement is a very effective form of advertising. 0 7 Moreover, cigarette
companies have often placed their products in films that are obviously designed to appeal to children and young adults. Restricting

Fox, 492 US at 475.
If product placement were "more likely to deceive the public than inform it," it could
be banned without constitutional objection. Central Hudson, 447 US at 563-64.
" HR 5041 at §§ 2(1)-(17) (cited in note 6). This section of the bill outlines a number
of findings regarding the aggregate effects of smoking on the United States. It particularly
noted that "children are beginning to smoke today at a younger age than ever before," and
chronicled previous failed attempts by Congress to address the problems caused by cigarette
advertising. Id at §§ 2(4), 2(17).
100 Central Hudson, 447 US at 564. A ban on all product placement would almost certainly be unconstitutional because it would be difficult for the government to assert the
requisite "substantial interest."
The interests asserted by the government in the Waxman bill are clearly more serious
and enjoy more evidentiary support than the amorphous interests found to be substantial in
Fox. In Fox, the Court found that SUNY's interests in "promoting an educational rather
than commercial atmosphere" on campus, "preventing commercial exploitation," and "preserving residential tranquility," were substantial. 492 US at 475.
"I Posadas,478 US at 341. See also Fox, 492 US at 475 (stating that "promoting safety
and security [and] preventing commercial exploitation of students" are substantial
interests).
102 See note 38 and accompanying text.
103 See, for example, Capital Broadcasting, 333 F Supp at 585.
Fox, 492 US at 475.
1o 333 F Supp at 582.
10. Id at 585.
107 See note 34 and accompanying text.
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the product placement of cigarettes would therefore reduce the aggregate amount of cigarette advertising to which viewers are exposed. This would help to reduce the number of persons, particularly children and young adults, who begin smoking each year.
Statistical evidence of a link is not required: the Court has expressly acknowledged that "advertising . . . serve[s] to increase
the demand for the product advertised.' ' 1 8 Indeed, if tobacco companies did not believe that product placement would increase
sales, they would have no motive to engage in it.'
Finally, there is a reasonable "'fit' between [Congress's] ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." 1 0 The relevant
portions of the bill would prevent only the placement of cigarettes
by tobacco companies. Filmmakers could continue to purchase cigarettes for inclusion in a film if they so desired. Further, the bill
would not place a blanket prohibition on smoking in movies, or
even on showing brand name cigarettes in a film; rather, it would
simply seek to reduce the number of smokers by restricting the
ability of tobacco companies to promote their cigarettes in movies.
Moreover, Fox stated that courts must defer to governmental decisionmakers in determining which "manner of regulation may best
be employed";" therefore, the existence of a theoretically less restrictive measure would not render the provision unconstitutional.
The limited restriction proposed by the modified bill is, therefore,
narrowly tailored to meet the stated objective and would constitute
1 2
a "reasonable" fit.
CONCLUSION

Films today are filled with placed products. Indeed, product
placement is so prevalent in modern filmmaking that the products
blend unnoticeably into films. Under the most recent views announced by the Supreme Court, the portions of films containing
product placement should be defined as commercial speech, and
thus should be regulable.
The government can and should move to restrict the placement of products, like cigarettes, which are dangerous to movie
viewers, particularly given the willingness of manufacturers and

108

Posadas, 478 US at 342. See also Central Hudson, 447 US at 569 (stating that

"[t]here is an immediate connection between advertising and demand").
"I Posadas, 478 US at 342.
11 Fox, 492 US at 480, citing Posadas, 478 US at 341.
"' Id at 480.
A's Id.
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filmmakers to direct these placements towards young people. Restrictions or outright bans on product placement of other products
which, like tobacco, are already subject to federal regulation, are
both possible and desirable."' Initially, however, Congress should
work to pass a modified version of the Waxman bill such as the
one proposed in this Comment. Only when such a measure is
passed will the government be able to end disturbing efforts by
tobacco companies to peddle their wares to unsuspecting
moviegoers.

"1
A strong case can be made that brewing and distilling companies should be prohibited from placing alcohol products and logos in films. At least one commentator has argued
that the tremendous costs to American society as a result of alcohol consumption constitute
a substantial governmental interest in the health and welfare of the country and would
justify restrictions on advertising. Note, We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the
Wine: The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising on Television, 58 S Cal L Rev 1107 (1985).
Like tobacco products, alcoholic beverages are often placed in films that are designed to
appeal to children and teenagers who are below the legal drinking age. See, for example, 13
Am Mktplace (cited in note 36) (describing placement of Miller Brewing Company products
in Gremlins and Police Academy 2, as well as in television shows and music videos); Miller,
265 Atlantic at 44-47 (cited in note 1) (noting the placement of Miller beer, Budweiser, and
Jim Beam in Bull Durham, Lite beer in Mr. Mom, and Budweiser in Rocky III and Over the
Top).

